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THE JAMES GOOLD CUTLER TRUST 
In 1926 the late James Goold Cutler, Esq., 
of Rochester, New York, established a trust 
fund for the benefit of the College of William 
and Mary in Virginia. Its purpose was to en-
dow the John Marshall Professorship of Govern-
ment and Citizenship in the Marshall-Wythe 
School of Govemment and Citizenship; to pro-
vide certain prizes for student essays; and to 
maintain a course of lectures on the . Constitu-
tion of the United States. One lecture is de-
livered annually by an eminent authority on 
the subject. Mr. Cutler possessed an abiding 
faith in the American constitutional system, 
but felt that popular understanding of the 
Constitution in all its phases is necessary for 
its continuance. 
Mr. Cutler was one of the few eminently 
successful business men who took time from 
his busy life to study constitutional govern-
ment. As a result of his study, he recognized 
with unusual clearness the magnitude of our 
debt to the makers, interpreters and defenders 
of the Constitution of the United States . 
. He was deeply interested in the College of 
William and Mary because he was a student of 
history and knew what contributions were 
made to the cause of constitutional govern-
[ 3 ] 
ment by men who taught and studied here-
Wythe and Randolph, Jefferson and Marshall, 
Monroe and Tyler, and a host of others who 
made this country great. He, therefore, thought 
it peculiarly fitting to endow a chair of govern-
men t here and to provide for a popular "lecture 
each year by some outstanding authority on 
the Constitution of the United States." 
The seventh lecturer in the series was Hon-
orable Newton Diehl Baker of Cleveland, Ohio, 
Secretary of War under President Woodrow 
Wilson, former member of the permanent Court 
of Arbitration at The Hague, and an outstand-
ing authority on the subject of Constitutional 
law. 
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THE MAKING AND KEEPING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
NEWTON DIEHL BAKER 
Former Secretary of War 
MR. PRESIDENT, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: 
Upon an old book plate which I used to see 
very often, there was in Latin this advice, "If 
you would trace the course of rivers, seek first 
the fountains from which they spring"-sectari 
rivulos petere fontes. I wonder how anyone 
who is to speak on the Constitution could more 
nearly "seek the fountain from which it springs" 
than to come here to the halls of this ancient 
college where many of the men who started 
that Constitution on its eventful career were 
educated. 
The subject which has been selected for today 
is "The Making and Keeping of the Constitu-
tion." It was no doubt a part of Mr. Cutler's 
purpose that each speaker who came here should 
say something about the Constitution itself. 
Perhaps he was not exacting enough to expect 
'any of us to say much that is new about so 
venerable and debated a subject. Yet I am 
persuaded that those who do come here to speak 
need not despair of at least finding somebody 
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to whom some of the things they wish to say are 
unfamiliar. 
Not in a complaining, but in a descriptive 
spirit, may I say that in New York a few days 
ago it occurred to me that I would like to have 
a pamphlet copy of the Constitution to hold in 
my hand today. I sent to the largest book-
stores and some of the smaller bookstores in 
New York to get such a copy. My messenger, 
however, returned and told me that there were 
no copies of the Constitution to be had in the 
bookstores in New York. When one recalls 
how genuinely the Constitution is the foundation 
and repository of all of our personal rights and 
all of our hopes for the continuance of free 
government, he could well wish that every 
household in America had on the center table 
of the room in which the family most often 
gathers, a copy of that document, and that its 
famous phrases could be a part of the daily 
reading and meditation of the people to whom 
the keeping of that Constitution is entrusted. 
Probably few of us, without refreshing our 
recollection, realize how exceedingly brief a 
document the Constitution in fact is. The 
Preamble, which admittedly contains no dis-
tribution of governmental power, is a concise 
and moving explanation of the purpose of the 
founders in ordaining and establishing the Con-
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stitution of the United States. This Preamble 
is followed by seven articles. They define 
and distribute the powers of the government 
and prescribe the mechanics of its organization 
and operation. Every part of the Constitution 
indicates clearly that the government to be set t 
up is that of a federated state, and there are 
many evidences of a consciousness on the part 
of the makers that jealous and independent 
sovereignties were pooling their common in-
terests, while preserving their peculiar interests 
for state and local control. 
The first Article deals with legislative power. 
It creates the Senate and House of Representa-
tives, the method of selection of members, the 
time and place of meeting; and Section 8 of 
Article I enumerates under eighteen headings 
the powers entrusted to Congress. Section 9 
contains eight prohibitions upon Congress and 
Section 10 three prohibitions upon the States. 
The second Article has to do with the execu-
tive and after providing for the method of his 
election, makes him the commander-in-chief 
of the military forces of the Nation and gen-
erally imposes upon him the obligation to see 
that the laws of the Nation are enforced. 
The third Article deals with the judiciary. 
It creates the Supreme Court and entrusts to 
Congress from time to time the power to ordain 
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and establish other courts inferior to the Su-
preme Court, to fix their jurisdiction except as 
certain elements of jurisdiction are fixed in the 
Article itself, and to fix compensation for judicial 
servIce. 
The fourth Article requires each State to af-
ford full faith and credit to the public acts and 
judicial proceedings of every other State and 
enumerates the privileges of citizens travelling 
from one State to another; gives Congress power 
over territory and provides the method of erect-
ing and admitting new States. 
Article V deals with the subject of amend-
ments to the Constitution, upon which I shall 
have more to say in a moment. 
Article VI imposes upon the new government 
liability for the debts and engagements entered 
into prior to the adoption of the Constitution; 
declares the supremacy of the Constitution, the 
laws of the United States, and treaties made 
under its authority; and prohibits any religious 
test for the holding of any office or public trust 
under the United States. 
Article VII outlines the method of ratification 
and proclaiming the Constitution, if and when 
ratified. 
The brevity of the Constitution is due in the 
main to two causes. In the first place, it deals 
with the structure of a government and avoids 
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mere legislative enactments. It states prin-
ciples and grants or withholds powers, but the 
details of the application of those principles 
and powers are left to be worked out and changed 
from time to time. In the second place, the 
men who wrote the Constitution were men who 
wrote the English language and understood 
what it meant. It is thus characteristically 
spare and concise. I have not counted the 
number of adjectives in the document, but I 
should be very much surprised were I to dis-
cover upon counting that there are so many as 
four. 
The record of the Convention shows the senti-
ment of that body to have been against grant-
ing any power to the general government until 
the need for it was clearly shown. Madison's 
notes are full of discussions which seek to limit 
proposed grants of power. Similarly debates 
throughout the body of the country were char-
acterized by anxiety lest words carelessly used 
might be held to have contained grants of 
power which the States were unwilling to give 
to the central government. 
Article VII of the Constitution provided that 
the ratification of the conventions of nine states 
should be sufficient to establish the Constitution 
between the States so ratifying. Upon the 
completion of the document, it was, therefore, 
[9 ] 
submitted to the several States and in many of 
them subjected to protracted discussion and 
debate. Twelve of the thirteen States did 
ratify. One State, Rhode Island, as you may 
recall, did not ratify for two years and remained 
for that time outside of the Union. To their 
acts of ratification, however, many of the States 
attached reservations and recommendations so 
that in all there were one hundred thirty-three 
such reservations to be considered by the first 
Congress under the Constitution which was to 
start the government in motion. When that 
Congress met, James Madison, who more than 
anybody else had guided the deliberations of 
the Convention, proposed twelve amendments 
as containing the substance of the one hundred 
thirty-three reservations and resolutions trans-
mitted with their acts of ratification by the 
several States. These twelve amendments were 
then submitted and ten of them adopted, always 
thereafter known as the First Ten Amendments. 
Perhaps the most common criticism of the 
Constitution in these state-wide discussions 
was the absence of a Bill of Rights, and the 
reservation most often appearing in the ratify-
ing acts aimed to make quite clear that the new 
government was to be one of enumerated powers 
and that all the powers not granted were re-
served. Accordingly the amendment we now 
[ 10] 
know as the tenth provides in terms, "The 
powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." To those who had desired 
a bill of rights in the Constitution, it had been 
replied that no such bill was necessary in view 
of the fact that the general government was to 
have no powers except those expressly granted, 
and that, therefore, none of the liberties and 
immunities ordinarily contained in a bill of 
rights needed to be expressed since there was 
obviously no power delegated to the central 
government which would prejudice such rights. 
But this assurance was not enough. It was 
entirely clear to the first Congress that ratifica-
tion had been secured by a practical promise of 
amendment to reassure whatever anxiety there 
was upon this point. 
Since the adoption of the First Ten Amend-
ments, eleven more have been adopted. From 
the beginning, more than three thousand pro-
posals to amend the Constitution have been 
suggested and submitted to the Congress. Of 
that three thousand only twenty-seven have 
been actually submitted to the States, and of 
the twenty-seven so submitted, only twenty-
one have been adopted and one of those repeals 
an earlier amendment. From this it is clear 
[ 11 ] 
that we have regarded the Constitution as a 
fundamental expression of the principle upon 
which we desired our government to operate, 
and that only under very unusual and special 
circumstances have we been willing to modify 
it. A rapid glance at the amendments which 
have in fact been made is a further evidence of 
the general attitude on this subject. 
The eleventh Amendment was a popular 
response to a decision of the Supreme Court 
holding that a State could be made a party 
defendant by citizens of another State. This 
was deemed a denial of sovereign power by the 
State of Georgia, the defendant in the suit in 
question, and the judgment rendered against it 
was never acknowledged or obeyed. The elev-
enth Amendment, therefore, remedied what was 
regarded as a defect and denied the jurisdiction 
for the future. 
The twelfth Amendment had to do with the 
manner of electing the President and Vice-
President and grew out of a practical deadlock 
occasioned by the inadequate provisions of 
Section 3 of Article II of the original Constitu-
tion. 
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth 
Amendments recorded the consequences of the 
Civil War, dealing primarily with the abolition 
of slavery and the political and economic rights 
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of former slaves. The sixteenth Amendment 
authorized the imposition of income taxes after 
the Supreme Court of the United States had 
several times reversed its own rulings upon their 
validity. The seventeenth Amendment author-
ized the election of United States senators by 
direct popular vote. The eighteenth Amend-
ment established prohibition, the nineteenth 
gave voting rights to women, and the twentieth 
changed the date of the beginning of the terms 
of elective Federal officers, executive and legis-
lative. The twenty-first Amendment repealed 
the eighteenth Amendment. An amendment 
which, if adopted, would become the twenty-
second Amendment, authorizes Congress to 
regulate child labor. Only fifteen States have, 
however, so far ratified, while by the provisions 
of the Constitution itself, three-fourths of the 
States must concur and submission to the States 
requires the concurrent vote of two-thirds of 
the two houses of the National Congress. 
There are four ways by which the Constitu-
tion of the United States can be amended. 
First, the formal submission of amendments 
either to the State legislatures or to conventions 
called in the States for the purpose. Second, 
the Constitution makes it possible to call a 
constitutional convention, the recommendations 
of which must likewise be submitted for ratifi-
[ 13 ] 
b 
cation. This process has never been tried. 
In addition to these modes of amendment, how-
ever, there are two others. The first of these is 
interpretation by the Supreme Court of the 
United States. Through this channel have 
come continuous amendments until it has been 
sometimes said that to all intents and purposes, 
the Supreme Court of the United States is an 
adjourned session of the Constitutional Con-
vention, sitting constantly to amend and modify 
the Constitution as the necessities of our de-
veloping situation may require. By this I do 
not mean that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has ever consciously allowed its views of 
public policy to persuade it to adopt a strained 
interpretation of the language of the Constitu-
tion, but rather I do mean that with great wis-
dom and deeply impressed with the responsi-
bility of its function, that great Court has re-
vealed the adequacy of the language of the 
Constitution to the developing civilization of 
a growing people and prevented a mere dry 
interpretation of words from being a restraint 
upon the spirit of those who designed the Con-
stitution to be the basis of a more perfect union 
and an adequate assurance of justice and do-
mestic tranquility in a great nation. 
One other unwritten mode of amending the 
Constitution is by disregarding it by unani-
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mous consent. We have experimented with 
this several times with uniformly unfortunate 
results. It seems to me to be the least desirable 
of all the modes of amendment, though it is 
perhaps an application of a thoroughly Anglo-
Saxon principle to institutional development. 
I am sure that this audience all know that 
Gladstone once said that "the American Consti-
tution was the most wonderful work ever struck 
off at one time by the brain and purpose of man." 
That much of Mr. Gladstone's statement we 
are fond of quoting. What he really said, how-
ever, was, "As the British Constitution is the 
grea test organization that has ever proceeded 
from progressive history, so the American 
Constitution is the most wonderful work ever 
struck off at one time by the brain and purpose 
of man." 
The American and the British Constitution 
are two entirely different things. One is a 
series of great principles sometimes embodied 
in documents, beginning perhaps with the 
Magna Carta, and including parliamentary 
acts, like the Act of Settlement, evolved in 
revolutionary and dynastic crises in the life of 
England, but also involving traditional atti-
tudes of mind which have grown up as uncon-
scious predicates in the political thinking of a 
determined but biologically conservative peo-
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pIe. There is, of course, no such instrument as 
the British Constitution. When a bill is under 
debate in parliament, nobody can point by 
article and section to a fundamental law as 
showing the act to be within or without parlia-
mentary power, but somebody is quite sure to 
arise and he may be a country squire, a college 
professor, or one of the lords-law, lay, or 
clerical-and say, "The bill is unconstitutional." 
When challenged for his reason, he will say, 
"Well, it does not seem to me to be British." 
So far as a people universally have that kind of 
instinctive feeling about the fundamental law 
of their society, it may be that an unwritten 
constitution is better than a written one, or at 
least as good. Certainly this is true about the 
British Constitution, that under it, without 
strain and without difficulty, there have taken 
place incidents and episodes which created no 
crisis and aroused no feeling of violent antago-
nism and yet have in themselves marked insti-
tutional advances which would have been un-
thinkable to the ancestors of the men who en-
acted them. One such incident in our own day 
is strikingly illustrative of this possibility. Not 
long ago a dozen gentlemen sat around a table 
in London and decided that the British Empire 
had already become a federation of self-govern-
ing democracies. They, therefore, announced 
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their conclusion when the meeting was over and 
without a vote of any kind, either popular or 
legislative, the imperial pretensions with which 
Disraeli aroused the imagination of Queen Vic-
toria and her subjects gave way to the more 
modern and, I think, the nobler conception of 
self-governing constituencies uniting their ex-
ternal interests for administration by a central 
government. This was an instance of the opera-
tion of progressive history, but it makes a 
striking contrast to our own experience. 
In the two countries the processes have been 
exactly the reverse of each other. Great Britain 
started with an empire governing her colonies 
from Westminster. She grew into a federation 
in which the right of self-government was 
claimed by and accorded to her colonies. We 
started with thirteen independent sovereignties 
making very jealously guarded grants of right 
to a central government, and our growth has 
been in the direction of the absorption of the 
rights of the States by the Federal Government 
until one of our noted constitutional writers has 
described the process in a book entitled The 
Vanishing Power of the States. In other words, 
Great Britain's development has been in the 
direction of dispersing power: ours has been in 
the direction of centralizing power. 
The theory upon which our Constitution has 
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proceeded has been that all power is derived 
from the people; that the people delegate just 
so much of their power as they desire to the 
Government, which is their creature; and it is 
obvious that both the makers of the Constitu-
tion and its earlier interpreters sought to re-
strain any tendency toward centralization both 
by the severe requirements for amendment, and 
by the erection of the judiciary into a disinter-
ested final conservator of the limits both of 
power and action imposed by the Constitution 
on the central government. 
May I now turn from this hasty view of the 
mechanics and theory of the Constitution to say 
a word or two about the making of it. 
Weare rather disposed, I think, to imagine 
that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
more or less evolved the document it submitted 
out of thin air, or at least out of philosophical 
specula tions of an untried and theoretical sort. 
Of course, that is just not true. The colonial 
governments in America in the first place had 
had large experience in the matter of self-govern-
ment. They had had a long period during 
which they were tugging against the restraints 
imposed by royal governors, and in no place is 
that history more centered than in the very spot 
where we now are. England in those days was 
a long distance from America. The British 
[ 18 ] 
Parliament was a remote institution concerned 
primarily with British interests, and it was easy 
to imagine it with defective knowledge of Ameri-
can conditions. There had grown up in America 
a race of men who were political figures at home, 
planters for the most part, with leisure which 
they had the culture to spend in reading and 
meditation. These men on the banks of the 
James and of the Potomac, or in the capitals 
and county seats of New England, delighted to 
inform themselves in political theory. There 
were not many books in those days and all of 
these scholarly men read the same books and so 
had an identity of speculative background and 
more or less an identity of information about 
political experiments described in history. In 
other words, they were a highly specialized and 
educated class and their intimate talk had to do 
with theories and experiments in government. 
It used to be said, no doubt with truth, that 
Thomas Jefferson had at Monticello in the 
drawer of a desk, a hundred written constitu-
tions of democracies, all of which had failed. 
Surely one of the great merits of Jefferson, one 
of his outstanding contributions to our political 
experiment, lies in the fact that in spite of one 
hundred failures, he still had the faith to believe 
that a democracy was a possible thing-that it 
could succeed. If there was about him at 
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that time and in the air of America, grave doubt 
on that subject, there was warrant for such 
doubt, for the history of the world up to the time 
of the declaration of independence showed 
many brave attempts at democracy, all of 
which gave way readily to dictatorships, which 
in turn were succeeded by privileged classes 
under some form of monarchical organization. 
When the Constitutional Convention met in 
1787, the great bulk of its members were these 
trained political philosophers, but their colonial 
experience with local self-government made 
them practical men. There was little dispo-
sition on their part to jump off of the planet 
and yield to the lure of untried but attractive 
theories. In addition to that, they had before 
them the experience of the United States in the 
so-called "critical period" between the Declara-
tion of Independence and 1787, when a feeble 
and loosely organized central government ex-
isted without a chief executive and the country 
had gone from one disaster to another. The 
principle of the Articles of Confederation may be 
said to have been the creation of a central gov-
ernment which should have power to act only 
to the extent that it could secure the voluntary 
cooperation of the States. By the time the 
Convention met there were no people left who 
believed that a great nation, or any nation, 
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could exist in America unless the central gov-
ernment were given supreme power in purely 
national concerns. 
Probably rarely has there gotten together 
a group of men so prepared to discuss political 
issues of the first order as at our Constitutional 
Convention. It was not a large body, but it 
was a picked body. George Washington pre-
sided over it and Virginia contributed in addi-
tion to that first character in the Nation, James 
Madison, called the "Father of the Constitu-
tion," and others of her great sons. Washing-
ton's contribution was one of character and 
common sense, but around him on every hand 
were the finest political intellects to be found in 
the country and the debates as recorded by 
Madison were always earnest, often threatened 
complete failure of the undertaking, and were 
finally brought into harmony chiefly by the 
domination of Washington's character and the 
profound and conciliatory worldly wisdom of 
Benjamin Franklin. 
I do not know any book to compare with 
The Federalist. Most of its papers were written 
by Hamilton. Jay and Madison contributed 
those which he did not write. In their original 
form, these were papers or essays printed in 
such newspapers as there were and distributed 
in pamphlet form. As a book they make up 
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four hundred pages of ordinary print, which 
educated people in our day find it difficult to 
read,-it is so compact, so concise and direct in 
its arguments; it is so weighted with historical 
references and detailed in its analyses that it 
makes what we modern people, with our radio 
minds, call "hard reading." But we must 
remember that these papers were addressed to 
the people of the United States and were under-
stood by them, a fact which shows that they 
were a great people. Indeed, I imagine that a 
great literature may be defined as great books 
written by great men, addressed to the interest 
of great people who are prepared to understand 
them. The audience is as much as the author 
in the making of a great book. The plays of 
Sophocles could never have been written but 
for the existence of the people of Athens, nor 
could Shakespeare's plays have survived their 
author but for the fact that he merely recorded 
the thoughts and emotions of a highly imagi-
native and daring people, who were building 
with rough hands a great civilization upon 
founda tions of sound emotion and character. 
So if we turn the cart around the other way, I 
think we are obliged to ascribe the greatness 
of the Constitution and of its literary and argu-
mentative defense to the fact that the people of 
the United States in 1787 were a highly de-
veloped and highly educated political people. 
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The Constitution was then a crystallization 
of the experience and wisdom of a people ac-
customed to political thinking-a people also 
living through the disheartening experience of a 
government structurally incapable of effective 
functioning. When the new Constitution was 
tendered, it was accepted by the people as an 
expression of their best hope and of their highest 
purposes. 
We come now to another question suggested 
by the title of this address. The Constitution 
having been made and having grown as it has, 
how can we, the successors and political heirs 
of the architects and interpreters of the Consti-
tution, best preserve it. 
If any analogy is to be drawn from the way 
in which the Constitution was made, it would 
seem that the keeping of the Constitution would 
also depend upon our having two qualifications. 
In the first place there will have to be dedicated 
to the Constitution the devotion of the highest 
trained intellects and consciences of the Na-
tion. By these, of course, I mean those whose 
historical perspective will assure them against 
short-range thinking- men who know the ex-
perience of the race in its institutional struggle 
toward liberty and will not be tempted to yield 
for today's expediency the permanent immuni-
[ 23 ] 
ties and guarantees of the future. Second, and 
quite equally indispensable, there will have to 
be a broad and sympathetic appreciation 
throughout the people of the United States of 
what the Constitution is and what it means 
and what its value is to them and to posterity. 
With that thought in mind, I turn just a mo-
ment to the part of this audience made up of 
young men and young women who are students 
in this College. 
You boys and girls are going to face demands 
of all sorts for constitutional change. There will 
be pressed upon you suggestions of convenience 
and social amelioration, attractive in them-
selves and especially attractive to the mind of 
youth, which is spontaneously generous in its 
responses. Unless you have traced the river 
of the Constitution to the springs from which it 
arises, unless you know what the Constitution is 
and why it may be said to have mothered the 
greatness of this great Democracy, unless you 
know the failures and the cause of the failure of 
other attempts to operate constitutional gov-
ernment, your judgments will necessarily be 
infirm in the face of such appeals. This then 
is a challenge to you to be prepared, and prepa-
ration lies not only in being generous and sym-
pathetic, but in disciplining those fine emotions 
into the possibility of practical achievement by 
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subjecting them to the restraints of a wisdom 
born only of knowledge and experience. 
Now let us look at the Constitution for a 
moment from another point of view. The 
Philadelphia Convention was not a harmonious 
body. There were wide differences of feeling 
among the colonists and these were reflected 
by their representatives in Philadelphia. In 
the body of the Constitution there are evidences 
of the compromises which were necessary to 
harmonize these difficulties. As a matter of 
fact, throughout the meetings of the Constitu-
tional Convention and almost up to its final 
adjournment, the opinion prevailed in the body 
and outside that agreement was substantially 
impossible. Letters from the statesmen of the 
period, which have been preserved, to their 
friends indicate almost despair. Most of the 
members of the Convention were relatively 
young men. I suppose in the language of today 
that body may be regarded as our first "Brain 
Trust." But there was present a man more 
than eighty years of age who sat sagely through 
the disputes and controversies of his younger 
associates, and every now and then, with some 
captivating bit of humor or, in very grave con-
troversies, with a sentence of solemn prayer, 
called them back to the business in hand. In 
the heat of one of these controversies, Benjamin 
[ 25 ] 
Franklin said, "Gentlemen, we were sent here 
to confer, not to contest with one another." 
Resorting to everything from gentle scolding 
to patting and praying, Franklin on the floor 
and Washington in the chair held the Conven-
tion together until the Constitution issued. 
Some of the compromises of the Constitution 
are interesting both historically and because of 
their consequences. One of these which espe-
cially interests me is the sort of joint guardian-
ship of the Nation's foreign relations entrusted 
to the Executive and Senate. If I were in the 
Congress, I think I would introduce Amend-
ment No. 3001, leaving the initiative of the 
treaty-making power to the President a"nd re-
quiring the ratification of treaties by a majority 
vote of the two houses rather than the two-
thirds vote of the Senate as the Constitution -
now has it. 
In this modern world where war is just around 
the corner and just over the hill top, every thing 
happens with lightning speed. There is left 
for nations no moment of meditation. The 
action of every agent is instantly subjected to 
the emotional judgment of the people. As a 
matter of fact, the thought which I am thinking 
now, if it should be transferred to China, would, 
as a mere matter of calendar and clo<;k time, get 
there about a day before I say it or think it. 
[ 261 
The world is so linked together that we think 
simultaneously and if we are provoked, we are 
all provoked at the same time. Indignation 
does not spread slowly, but its causes wave over 
us and engulfus all at one time. The atmos-
phere of the modern world has become explosive 
and the slow-gaited machinery which was quite 
adequate in the more reposeful days of the be-
ginnings of the Republic, is quite inadequate now 
to deal with th~ tempests of national feeling 
which are fanning international discords into 
international conflagrations. There are two 
reasons, and only two, that I have ever been 
able tp discover for the present allocation of 
power on this subject in the Constitution. The 
members of the Convention realized that a 
certain secrecy, or at least confidential char-
acter, was necessary in the preliminary discus-
sions of international questions, and as there 
were to be but twenty-six senators, the Con-
vention assumed that twenty-six men could keep 
a secret so that it would be safe for the President 
to advise with the Senate while national issues 
and interests were being assessed as they might 
be affected by one course or another in a pros-
pective treaty. Whether or not the Conven-
tion was right in assuming that twenty-six men 
could keep a secret, it is not now important to 
consider. ,The number of senators is now 
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ninety-six, and among that number it is quite 
impossible to hope for a universal prevalence of 
restraint and reserve. Indeed, in quite recent 
times it has seemed permissible to the Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Sen-
ate to parallel the President's initiative in 
foreign affairs by himself undertaking to express 
to foreign representatives his views upon such 
questions, whether they were at variance with 
that of the Executive or not. I do not see how 
any foreign ambassador in Washington, who 
wants to negotiate a treaty with the United 
States, can make up his mind whether he ought 
to begin his conversations with the Secretary 
of State or the Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee. 
The other reason was that in Colonial times 
there were certain issues deemed of great im-
portance by sections of the country but of 
relatively little prospective importance in other 
sections. The people of New England were 
exceedingly concerned that their fishermen 
should have access to the waters to the north. 
Here in the South, and a little farther west and 
south of us, the people had little concern about 
fishing rights, but they were quite sure that the 
expansion and growth of this new country was 
conditioned by the right of unrestricted naviga-
tion of the Mississippi with outlets into the Gulf 
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of Mexico. Virginia particularly, owning land 
extending almost indefinitely to the west, was 
unwilling to have any power given to the Fed-
eral Government which would make it possible 
to barter away the right of navigating the Mis-
sissippi for the purpose of securing fishing rights 
in the northern waters for the people in New 
England. In all sections of the country there 
was a fear lest the new government might be 
tempted by sectional interests to prefer one 
section to the other, and the two-thirds rule 
was obviously intended to make it impossible 
for any section of the country which could not 
muster more than a bare majority of the sena-
tors to prefer northern fisheries to Mississippi 
navigation, or indeed to effect any settlement 
with one of our international neighbors prej-
udicial to some other ,section of the country. 
Now in the long after years, New England's 
hearty fishermen explore the northern fisheries 
in serene security from any international re-
straint, and the commerce of the greatest 
Nation in the world rides unvexed upon the 
flood of the Mississippi to the sea, but this 
compromise is still with us, maiming our power 
and handicapping us to deal as a modern na-
tion in our international relations. The simple 
question of the adhesion of the United States 
to the World Court, a court the establishment of 
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which is distinctly the contribution of an idea 
to international development by America, a 
court which is one of the dignified and conspicu-
ous elements in the machinery which a stricken 
world set up after the devastating World War 
to preserve international peace, that question is 
delayed over a dozen years by the unwillingness 
of the Senate to act upon it. And this inaction 
is the more noteworthy when it is recalled that 
every Secretary of State and every President of 
the United States from the days of Theodore 
Roosevelt until now has ardently urged either 
that the United States take the lead in the estab-
lishment of such a court, or adhere to it after it 
had in fact been established. 
The time runs and this address will soon ex-
ceed the proper limits of the occasion, yet I do 
wish to say a word about the wisdom of keep-
ing the Constitution. 
When the Constitution was first proposed, 
the debates had very largely to do with revenue 
and the rights of the States inside the Union. 
Hamilton's papers in the Federalist enlarge upon 
the advantage of a strong general government to 
make common cause for us all in dealing with the 
rest of the world. A more perfect union would 
enable us to defend our rights from a military 
point of view, and the national credit would be 
an element both of military and commercial 
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strength. In these days of emotional approach, 
it is not uncommon for men who have not read 
and thought much about the Constitution to 
describe it as a document adopted by property 
owners for the defense of property. Thoughtless 
and inflamed speakers and writers permit them-
selves to point out that members of the Conven-
tion were themselves large owners of property 
and to draw from that fact the unwarranted 
deduction that the greatest patriots in America, 
who had nearly all of them exposed their lives 
in the assertion of the country's freedom, im-
mediately became a lot of conspirators, quieting 
their consciences for the protection of their 
purses. In the light of history, that is perfectly 
untrue. It is true that the members of the 
Convention had the capacity and willingness 
to pay their debts. They were people of fi-
nancial responsibility, but nobody can read 
Madison's debates without realizing 'that what 
George Washington said of the Convention was 
true and that what John Adams said of it was 
true. Both praised the integrity of the mem-
bers of the body, and John Adams said of the 
Constitution that it was "a document produced ...--/ 
by sound heads inspired by sound hearts." 
I venture to believe that the idea that there is 
some difference between personal rights and 
property rights is the product of unclear think-
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ing. Property has no rights. Persons have 
rights with regard to property. There is no 
higher liberty than that a person should have 
the right to enjoy property that results from his 
efforts. Liberty to enjoy the fruits of one's 
labors takes the form of a property right, but 
it will be clearer if we say that it takes the form 
of a personal right with regard to property. 
It clouds the issue and obscures discussion to set 
up an imaginary opposition between rights of 
property and rights of persons. That there 
should be limitations upon the rights of per-
sons both with regard to other persons and with 
regard to property is too clear for debate, but the 
Constitution does not permit us to be blind to 
the fact that when we take property from one 
man and give it to another by legislative enact-
ment, we are not preferring the personal right 
of .the recipient to the property right of the 
person from whom it is taken. In both in-
stances we are dealing with the rights of per-
sons as to property. Indeed, I am persuaded 
that in the one hundred and fifty years of our 
experience under the Constitution, a very sub-
stantial part of the service rendered to us by the 
Supreme Court of the United States has lain in 
its protection of the right to the pursuit of 
happiness and the vigor with which it has main-
tained our personal and business ethical obliga-
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tions, showing the identity of the conduct dic-
tated by honor with that required by consti-
tutional principle. 
Amendments to the Constitution have been 
relatively few, some of them perhaps not wholly 
wise. For instance, I am myself not entirely 
clear that it would not have been better to leave 
the election of United States senators to the 
State legislature. I realize that there may well 
be earnest difference of opinion about this. I 
do not think the answer to the question is found 
by merely attempting to compare the distinc-
tion of individual members of the Senate se-
lected by one or the other of these processes. 
The fact is that the democratic principle is sub-
ject to two forms of attack. First, a frank 
denial of its validity. That attack we can al-
ways meet both on principle and with the les-
sons of experience. The second attack, how-
ever, is more subtle. It consists in overloading 
the operation of the principle until its back is 
broken by the imposition of tasks greater 
than can be borne. The principle is entirely 
satisfied by the complete control of ultimate 
power in the people. If, however, the people 
are called upon ceaselessly to perform directly 
the detailed tasks of operation, the burden be-
comes too great and the response by the people 
will necessarily be uninformed and ineffective. 
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In the great cItIes of this country, the voter 
faces such a multitude of candidates for such 
a multitude of offices that the task of selection 
is an impossible burden. Chance, impulse, 
and the suggestiveness of the names of candi-
dates become the only canons of choice. The 
voter may enter the booth with a sense of 
democratic power, but if he is honest, he 
emerges with a conviction of democratic de-
feat. 
We have lived to a time when the world is 
troubling itself about other forms of govern-
ment. When the World War was over, an-
cient and traditional forms of government were 
not only in disrepute, but in a state of collapse. 
Independent and restless peoples everywhere 
suddenly realized that they were free. They 
called constitutional conventions imitating our 
model. They made bills of rights, distributions 
of powers, and imagined that that was the end 
of the old era and the easy and safe beginning of 
a new one. One after another, these new gov-
ernments failed, and they failed, of course, 
because the constitutions they had adopted 
were not the product of their progressive his-
tory. They were not the crystallizations of 
their own experience. They had had no experi-
ence in operating institutions of that sort, and 
when the multiplying natural difficulties of 
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operating democratic forms were undertaken by 
inexperienced people, they soon found them-
selves adrift at sea, with the result that they 
called in the Lenins, Hitlers, and Mussolinis 
to undertake by dictatorial processes the tasks 
which their unaccustomed hands found it im-
possible to do. With this the democratic 
principle began to come into disrepute and there 
grew up attacks upon it-on the one side by the 
Fascist theory and on the other side by the 
Communist theory. The adherents of both of 
these united only in defaming the principle of 
democracy. In the United States six months 
ago there was more uncertainty than there is 
today as to the pretensions of these alien theories 
in their competition for the favor which we 
have always hitherto given to democracy. 
That uncertainty is being dissipated. De-
mocracy is distinctly regaining its ascendency 
in the trained intellect of the world. Even in 
the countries in which these new and unusual 
forms have been resorted to, there are evidences 
of a fresh desire to revert to the democratic 
process. I doubt whether anybody in Russifl. 
really believes that the Communistic State will 
be the ultimate form of government there. 
I doubt very much whether anybody in Italy 
or Germany believes that Fascism or Hitlerism 
will be the final product of the political turmoil 
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through which those great countries have passed. 
In other words, these new forms and fashions 
attracted for a little while, but their output in 
human satisfactions has been disappointing to 
the point of disaster. 
Meantime the English-speaking nations of the 
world, longest trained in the democratic proc-
ess, have had their troubles too, but the virtue 
of democracy is that it permits the digestion of 
experience and unrevolutionary modifications 
of institutions so long as they are dictated by 
an informed public opinion. 
In the midst of a world filled with political 
speculation, and in an atmosphere of depres-
sion which has tried the faith of men in all 
human institutions, democracy has remained 
steadfast. This does not mean that any of the 
great democracies of the world like ours or 
that of the British is to stop growing. It does 
not mean that tomorrow is not to be better 
than today, but it seems to me that it does 
mean that the process by which we have grown 
from our small constitutional beginnings is 
demonstrated to be the wise and fruitful method 
of growing, and that our written Constitution, 
understood by and believed in by our people, 
evoking their loyalty and their love, and de-
fended by their intelligence, is the best assur-
ance of an increasing happiness and well-being. 
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• 6 .... . 
That kind of loyalty to the Constitution is the 
best hope man has yet evolved of an orderly 
government under which liberty shall remain 
possible. 
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